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I. INTRODUCTION
In The Supreme Court, Confessions, and Judicial Schizophrenia,
Professor Loewy argued that the Supreme Court's existing precedent dealing
with confessions demonstrates schizophrenia with "many of the inconsistent
statements [that] remain good law."' I agree. Much of that schizophrenia
springs from battles over Miranda v. Arizona,2 but also comes from the Fifth
Amendment itself and from its evolving meaning.3
Indeed, many in the legal academy and elsewhere find something to hate
about Miranda and the Fifth Amendment.' Or as the editors of the Boston
University Law Review observed in their introduction to a volume
commemorating Miranda's fiftieth anniversary, "the development and
application of Miranda doctrine have been attacked from all quarters of the
ideological spectrum." 5
Critics on the right and the left see Miranda as a failure for different
reasons; perhaps because it was an illegitimate intrusion into state power or
* Distinguished Professor of Law, the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law;
University of Pennsylvania, J.D., 1974; Swarthmore College, B.A., 1969. I want to extend my thanks to
former Dean and Professor Emeritus Gerald Caplan for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
Article and to my research assistant Amy Nicole Seilliere for her excellent work on this article.
1. Arnold H. Loewy, The Supreme Court, Confessions, andJudicialSchizophrenia, 44 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 427,427 (2007).
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. See Albert W. Alschuler, A PeculiarPrivilege in HistoricalPerspective: The Right to Remain
Silent, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2625, 2626-27 (1996) [hereinafter Alschuler, PeculiarPrivilege];see also Albert
W. Alschuler, Miranda's FourfoldFailure, 97 B.U. L. REv. 849, 850-54 (2017) [hereinafter Alschuler,
Miranda's FourfoldFuture] (arguing the decision of the Court in Miranda shows a misunderstanding of
the Fifth Amendment).
4.

See FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 158-59 (1970).

5. Symposium, Forewordto The Fiftieth Anniversary ofMiranda v. Arizona, 97 B.U. L. REV. 681,
681(2017).
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because the post-Warren Courts undercut its vitality.6 Some Miranda foes
continue to argue that it unnecessarily ties the hands of the police.' Others,
and I include myself in this group, see the post-Mirandacase law as an assault
on its central premises, rendering its protections limited at best.8
We tend to forget that Chief Justice Warren's slim Miranda majority
was trying to solve a very real problem. Between 1936 and 1963, the Court
repeatedly intervened in cases involving defendants who confessed under
questionable circumstances and who often faced the death penalty.9 In
addition, in many of those cases, the defendants were African-Americans,
found guilty in the South, where the fear of racial injustice was palpable.10
The Court's involuntariness case law provided little meaningful guidance to
lower courts, requiring the Court to intervene repeatedly."
Further, although Dean Gerald Caplan saw this as reason to criticize
Miranda, he observed that the Court was concerned about equality. 2 The
Court wanted to level the playing field between the state and the suspect.13
The Court was also motivated by concerns that wealthy suspects came armed
with legal advice, unlike indigent defendants unable to negotiate with the
police in the police-dominated environment. 14 As I argue below, Miranda
was a noble experiment.' Equality does matter in the criminal justice
system.' 6

At the same time, Mirandahas failed in so many ways. Almost certainly
for reasons anticipated by Justice White's Miranda dissent, Miranda has
protected relatively few criminal defendants." As one Miranda critic
observed, "[flor criminal suspects, the law rewards obstruction and

6. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,445 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Paul G. Cassell
& Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda'sHarmful Effects on
Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1055,1057 (1998).
7. See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 6, at 1062-63; see also Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles,
Opening Keynote Address, Still Handcuffing the Cops? A Review ofFifty Years ofEmpiricalEvidence of
Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 97 B.U. L. REv. 685, 848 (2017) (concluding restraints
placed on law enforcement by Miranda have made law enforcement less effective).
8. See Alschuler, PeculiarPrivilege, supra note 3, at 2629-30; Loewy, supra note 1, at 434-35;
infra Part II (discussing the post-Mirandacase law).
9. See Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Good Old Days of
Police Interrogation,48 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 746-47 (1987).
10. See id. at 747.
11. Id. at 746.
12. Gerald M. Caplan, QuestioningMiranda, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1417,1457-58 (1985).
13. Id. at 1419.
14. See id. at 1448-49. As I have argued in Reflections on an ExtraordinaryCareer:Thoughts About
Gerald Caplan'sRetirement, unlike some Mirandacritics, Caplan's proposals if followed would provide
suspects meaningful protections. Michael Vitiello, Reflections on an Extraordinary Career: Thoughts
About GeraldCaplan'sRetirement, 46 McGEORGE L. REv. 459,478-81 (2014).
15. See infra Part II (discussing how Miranda came into the Court).
16. E.g., Steven W. Bender, The Colors ofCannabis:Race and Marifuana,50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
689,701-03(2016).
17. Mirandav. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,534-35 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
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concealment."'" Many of the suspects who need Mirandaprotections fail to
invoke them; many who do invoke its protections are hardened criminalsnot a particularly deserving group of offenders.' 9
Given Miranda's failure, some commentators have suggested
alternatives to Miranda.2 0 Indeed, Professor Loewy has argued that the
criminal justice system would be better off had the Court followed its
pre-Miranda approach. 2 1 Beginning with Spano v. New York, 22 Justices
seemed prepared to hold that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel should
begin in the custodial interrogation setting. 2 3 The Court came close to this
holding in Escobedo v. Illinois.2 4 While I agree with Professor Loewy that
the pre-Miranda approach has some advantages, I propose a different
alternative. The Court should outlaw all custodial interrogation. One might
ask how the Court could do that as a matter of constitutional law and sound
policy. Let me explain.
So back to my title: what does Donald Trump have to do with this? As
I write this paper in the fall of 2018, Special Prosecutor Robert Mueller is
still negotiating with Trump and his lawyers about providing testimony in the
Russia investigation. 2 5Many Americans wonder why Mueller cannot compel
the President to testify in open court before a grand jury or elsewhere.2 6 There
is a powerful need for his testimony to resolve whether he participated in
efforts to undercut our democracy. 2 7 Indeed, the Supreme Court endorsed the
view that our system requires the testimony of every citizen, including a
sitting president. 2 8 Shouldn't we be able to hear from anyone with relevant
evidence?
How can one reconcile the Fifth Amendment and its underlying values
with the need for every citizen's testimony that is relevant to the
administration of justice? Miranda does not prevent the state from securing

&

18. Scott W. Howe, Moving Beyond Miranda: Concessions for Confessions, 110 Nw. U. L. REV.
905, 905 (2016).
19. Id. at 939 (first citing Richard A. Leo, Inside the InterrogationRoom, 86 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY 266, 286 (1996); then citing William J. Stuntz, Miranda's Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REv. 975,
977 (2001)).
20. Alschuler, A PeculiarPrivilege, supra note 3, at 2669-70; Caplan, supra note 12, at 1474-75;
Loewy, supra note 1, at 435.
21. See Loewy, supra note 1.
22. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
23. Id. at 324-25 (Douglas, J., concurring).
24. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
25. Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump's Lawyers CounterMueller's Interview Offer,
Seeking a Narrower Scope, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/08/us/politics
/trump-mueller-interview.html.
26. David Jackson, Can Robert Mueller Subpoena Donald Trump? Only the Supreme Court Would
Knowfor Sure, USA TODAY (May 2, 2018, 7:35 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/
2018/05/02/can-mueller-subpoena-trump-only-supreme-court-would-know-sure/573185002/.
27.

Norman Eisen, Unpacked: Will Trump Testify in Mueller's Russia Investigation?, BROOKINGS

(July 16, 2018),https://www.brookings.edu/blog/unpacked/2018/07/16/unpacked-will-trump-testify-inmuellers-russia-investigation/.
28. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 705-06 (1997).
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information from a suspect. 29 In fact, Chief Justice Warren suggested that the
warnings would not eliminate confessions; 3 0 instead, they would improve
fact-finding reliability. 3 1If one remembers the Court's goal in Miranda, one
can make sense of the Chief Justice's assertions. 32
Importantly, the Miranda Court was legitimately concerned with
equality and the inherent pressure of custodial interrogation.33 Those
concerns are not inconsistent with the need to secure everyone's relevant
evidence. This Article asks the following question: Can we have a system
that bans custodial interrogation but can still require suspects to tell their
version of the facts? The answer is, of course we can.3 4 Miranda'sgoals of
equality and clarity could be achieved if the police could not engage in
custodial interrogation, but instead had to bring a suspect before a judge for
appointment of counsel. 3 5That would be the case as long as the suspect could
be examined, as any other witness with relevant information.
Part II explores the pre-Miranda voluntariness cases and the Court's
search for a remedy to the problem of police abuse in the custodial setting.3 6
Part III reviews Miranda'simpact on the 1968 election and reviews some of
the post-Warren Court decisions that have narrowed Mirandaalmost beyond
recognition. 3 7 Part IV develops my core thesis: Miranda was motivated by
concerns about equality and putting indigent defendants on equal footing
with wealthy defendants. 3 8 That is a worthwhile goal. Further, those goals
can be advanced by abandoning custodial interrogation entirely. 39 Bona fide
law enforcement interests can be met as long as suspects are subject to
questioning with counsel present and the fact finder can draw an inference of
guilt from a suspect's invocation of the Fifth Amendment. 4 0 That would, of
course, require the Court to overrule Griffin v. California.41 But the resulting

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).
Id.
Id at 477.
See id.
Yale Kamisar, EqualJusticein the Gatehouses andMansionsofAmerican CriminalProcedure,

in POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 27 (1980).

34. See infra Part IV (explaining how to ban custodial interrogation and require suspects to reveal
their version of the facts).
35. See infra Part IV (discussing that the alternative to custodial interrogation is to bring the suspect
before a judge for appointment of counsel).
36. See infra Part II (exploring pre-Miranda cases).
37. See infraPart I (reviewing the effects of the Mirandadecision and the narrowing of the decision
thereafter).
38. See infra Part IV (speaking to the policy of the Miranda decision as to put defendants with
different socioeconomic statuses in the same position).
39. See infra Part IV (stating the goals of the Miranda decision can be met by getting rid of all
custodial interrogation).
40. See infra Part IV (advancing how law enforcement interests may still be met when custodial
interrogation is abandoned).
41. Griffinv. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
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system, effectively paralleling the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,4 2 would
accommodate both the needs of effective law enforcement and the legitimate
interests that motivated the MirandaCourt.4 3
II. THE ROAD TO MIRANDA

In 1936, for only the second time in its history, the Court overturned a
state criminal case." In Brown v. Mississippi, the state secured murder
convictions for African-American defendants, who were subsequently
sentenced to death based only on their confessions. 4 5 In commenting on the
evidence, Chief Justice Hughes stated one of the sheriffs deputies admitted
he beat one of the suspects: "It is interesting to note that in his testimony with
reference to the whipping of the defendant. Ellington, and in response to the
inquiry as to how severely he was whipped, the'deputy stated, 'Not too much
for a negro; not as much as I would have done if it were left to me. 4` Other
officials admitted to participating in the beatings, and no one denied the
beatings. 4 7The Court held securing a confession by use of torture violates the
Fourteenth Amendment because such a statement is involuntary.4 8
Over the next thirty years, the Court frequently revisited the meaning of
involuntariness.49 Most often, the cases involved the death penalty, and often
in cases arising in the South, involved African-American defendants.5 0 In
fact, over a thirty-year period after Brown, "the Supreme Court granted
review in over thirty-five cases in which confessions had been held
voluntary." 5' After Brown, the Court seldom faced instances where officers
admitted to using violence towards the defendant. 5 2 Instead, police used a
host of other techniques, including: the "third degree," use of trickery, goodcop-bad-cop interrogations, threats, and other devices to erode a suspect's
confidence even in one's own innocence. 5 3 In most of the cases the Court
reviewed, it reversed the convictions. 54
42. FED. R. CIv. P. 26-37; see Donald L. Edgar, Comment, Discovery ofDocuments and Things:
The FederalRules and the CaliforniaLaw, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 829 (1954).
43. See infra Part IV (arguing that both law enforcement interests and the interests of the Miranda
Court would be met by mirroring the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
44. PAUL FINKELMAN & CARY D. WINTZ, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICAN AMERICAN HISTORY, 1896
TO THE PRESENT: FROM THE AGE OF SEGREGATION TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 509 (2009); see

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
45. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 279 (1936).
46. Id. at 284.
47. Id. at 284-85.
48. Id. at 287.
49. Herman, supra note 9, at 749.
50. See id
51. Id. at 754.
52. See Wilfred J. Ritz, State Criminal Confession Cases: Subsequent Developments in Cases
Reversed by U.S. Supreme Court and Some CurrentProblems, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 202, 204 (1962).
53. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966).
54. Herman, supra note 9, at 754.
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Voluntariness cases posed additional problems as well. Commentators
identified some of those problems: How does one define involuntary?s Even
an offender facing torture in some sense has a choice: undergoing physical
pain or confessing. 5 6 How does one assess causation when an offender
confesses? 57
In light of questions like those posed above, the Court's rationales for
suppressing confessions varied over time. 5 Was the goal to keep unreliable
evidence from the jury? To control police misconduct? 6 0 To assure that the
offender has some level of freedom of choice in condemning himself? 61 The
case law seemed to create an "analytical stew." 62
Spano v. New York provided an insight into the complexity (or perhaps,
incomprehensibility) of the Court's test.6 3 There, a young, foreign-born man
with no history of criminal activity or familiarity with the police shot a much
larger man who was also a former professional boxer.' The victim took
money from the defendant, and when the defendant confronted him, the
victim knocked him down and kicked him in the head repeatedly." Shortly
thereafter, the defendant returned to the area, now with a firearm, and shot
the victim to death.6 6
The police were able to secure a confession from the defendant only
after several hours of interrogation and after using a friend of the defendant's
to cajole him into confession. Gaspar Bruno, the defendant's close personal
friend and a "fledgling police officer," received a call from the defendant
explaining the circumstances of the killing.6 8 The police eventually used
Bruno to get him to confess. 6 9 The police were able to get the defendant to
confess to facts that, despite a possible reduction of his crime to voluntary
manslaughter, allowed the state to secure a first-degree murder conviction
and the imposition of the death penalty.7 0
In resolving the issue, the Supreme Court cited no single reason why the
confession was involuntary. Instead, it listed over a dozen facts that
55. JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES
AND PERSPECTIVES 600 (6th ed. 2017).

56.
57.
58.

Id. at 590.
Id.; see Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).

59.

DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 55, at 603.

60.

Id.; see Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163.

61.

DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 55, at 603.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Spano, 360 U.S. at 315.
Id. at 316.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 318-19.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 318-19.
Id. at 327 (Stewart, J., concurring); see Knight v. State, 73 Ga. App. 556 (1946).
Spano, 360 U.S. at 324.
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supported its conclusion that the statement was involuntary. 7 2 As one
commentator observed, in cases like Spano, no single fact was controlling,
but almost everything was relevant to the conclusion.
Other problems with the Court's voluntariness case law existed as well.
Apart from the difficulty in implementing its multi-factored test, a trial
court's factual findings could prevent effective review if an appellate court
gave traditional deference to such findings.7 4 Instead, the Court developed a
greater level of scrutiny, reviewing the voluntariness finding itselfde novo.7 5
At least as early as Spano, members of the Court flirted with finding that
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel should attach at an earlier stage than
the Court had held.7 6 Moving the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the
stationhouse would presumably address the Court's concerns about police
overreaching. Instead, Miranda grounded the right to counsel in the Fifth
Amendment. 7 7 Influenced by Professor Yale Kamisar's important analysis,
the Court recognized that the right to remain silent at trial is meaningless if
the defendant has already confessed in the stationhouse. 9
Chief Justice Warren's opinion reads more like a legislative report than
a decision ofa specific legal question.o It defined the larger legal issues that
the Court faced and developed a set of procedural rules designed to protect
the underlying Fifth Amendment right. 8 In contrast to the fact-laden
voluntariness cases, 82 the Chief Justice barely addressed the facts of the four

72.
73.

Idat320-21.
See Herman, supra note 9. Lawrence Herman described the matter well:
It violates due process of law for the prosecution in a criminal case to use the defendant's
involuntary confession against him. Whether a confession is involuntary must be determined
by considering the totality of the circumstances-the characteristics of the defendant and the
environment and technique of interrogation. Under the "totality of the circumstances"
approach, virtually everything is relevant and nothing is determinative. Ifyou place a premium
on clarity, this is not a good sign .... The point is that the Mirandadissenters in 1966 and
the Attorney General in 1985 were simply wrong in their claim that we got along well with
the law that antedated Miranda.
Id at 745 (footnotes omitted).
74.

Peter B. Rutledge, The Standard of Review for the Voluntariness of a Confession on Direct

Appeal in FederalCourt, 63 U. CH. L. REv. 1311, 1312 (1996).
75. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286-87 (1936).
76. Spano, 360 U.S. at 320-21.
77. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966).
78. Kamisar, supra note 33.
79. Id. at 31; William T. Pizzi, Revisiting the Mansions and Gatehouses of Criminal Procedure:
Reflections on Yale Kamisar'sFamous Essay, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 633, 635 (2015).

80. David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity ofProphylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 190, 190 (1988).
81. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 487-89. in effect, Miranda created a double prophylaxis. Id. at 463. The
Fifth Amendment does not explicitly protect one from remaining silent, but only from being compelled to
be a witness against oneself. Id. at 461. Miranda'stheory is that a suspect need to be able to invoke silence
to protect himself from being compelled by the coercive environment from being a witness against
himself. Id. at 475. In addition, counsel's role is to protect the suspect in the coercive setting. Id. at 472.
82. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); see also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219
(1941) (dealing with a fact-laden voluntariness case).
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cases on review. 83 His opinion made clear that he wanted to get the Court out
of the business of assessing voluntariness on a case-by-case basis. 8As the
Chief Justice stated, "Assessments of the knowledge the defendant
possessed, based on information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior
contact with authorities, can never be more than speculation; a warning is a
clearcut fact."85
Miranda left many questions open. But the Chief Justice seemingly
expected two things to happen in a world where suspects have Miranda
rights. 8 6 The first was that suspects would routinely ask for advice of
counsel. 8 The second, however, was that the police would still be able to talk
to the suspect." The Chief Justice asserted that confessions would not dry up
and that fact-finding would be more reliable in a post-Miranda world.
Seemingly, he envisioned continued discussions with the police after counsel
arrived.90
Along the way, the MirandaCourt made two statements that would give
fuel to its critics: the first was an acknowledgement that under its traditional
voluntariness case law, at least some of the confessions before the Court
would not have been excluded at trial. 91 In addition, apparently at Justice
Brennan's suggestion, the Chief Justice included a suggestion that Congress
or state legislatures might come up with alternative remedies to the Court's
warnings. 92 Given the Court's limited authority over state court judgments,
critics argued that the Court lacked constitutional authority to impose
warnings because states did not have to follow them. 93 But that is part of the
post-Miranda story.

83. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 491.
84. Id at 524.
85. Id. at 468-69.
86. See id at 472, 481.
87. See id at 472.
88. Id.at481.
89. Id at 478-79.
90. See id. In practice, neither happens. Cassell & Fowles, supra note 7, at 829.
91. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 462-63.
92. Id. at 467; see also Yale Kamisar, From Miranda to § 3501 to Dickerson to. .. , 99MICH. L.
REv. 879, 886 (2001) (discussing state legislatures could come up with alternative remedies).
93. See Donald Dripps, Is the Miranda Caselaw Really Inconsistent?A ProposedFifth Amendment
Synthesis, CONST. COMMENT. 19, 20 (2000).
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IH. MRANDA'S BACKLASH
The public and professional reaction to Mirandawas almost universally
negative. 9 4 Law enforcement officials contended that it would limit their
ability to solve crimes. 9 5 Mirandacritics claimed confessions would dry up. 96
Race riots in many American cities in the late 1960s made law and order
a major campaign issue in the 1968 presidential election. 97 Vice President
Humphrey did not defend the Court. 9 8 George Wallace, who won the
American Independent Party nomination, was openly hostile to the Court. 99
For example, in one speech, he called the Court a "sorry, lousy, no-account
outfit." 0 While Wallace's open race baiting alienated many voters, Richard
Nixon used a more subtle appeal to racial animosity and fear.'0 1 His campaign
focused on law and order, an issue that allowed him to raise fears about racial
issues without explicitly discussing race.1 0 2 A large part of Nixon's
explanation for the rise in crime was the Warren Court's liberal rulings.10 3
Miranda may not have been the only ruling that alienated voters but it
was, almost certainly, the most important one. As Fred Graham observed,
Miranda "impose[d] limits on police interrogation that no state had ever
approached."' 0Nixon promised legislation to shift the balance back to the
police, away from criminal elements; the strategy worked. 0o
Even before Nixon took office, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.106 One of its most important provisions
was codified at 18 U.S.C. §3501, which effectively reinstated the
voluntariness test and overruled Miranda.0 7
The Court did not address the legality of§ 3501 for thirty-two years, 0 8
largely because members of the Justice Department believed that it was

94.

DRESSLER& THOMAS, supra note 55, at 646.

95. Victor Li, 50-Year Story ofthe Miranda WarningHas the Twists ofa Cop Show, A.B.A. J. (Aug.
1,2016,4:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/miranda warninghistory.
96. William W. Berry, Magnifying Miranda,50 TEX. TECH. L. RE. 97,100 (2017); see also Cassell
& Fowles, supra note 6, at 1060 (claiming Mirandaundercut the abilities of law enforcement).
97.

DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 55, at 647.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id
Id.
Id. at 646.
Id. at 647.
Id.
Id.

104.
105.

FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 158 (1970).
DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 55, at 648.

106.
107.
108.

34 U.S.C. § 10101 (1968).
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1968).
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
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unconstitutional.'" But between 1969 and 1971, Nixon made four
appointments to the Court with an eye towards overruling Miranda."o
Instead of directly overruling Miranda, the Court began to narrow the
decision in almost every instance." For example, while Mirandainsisted the
state carried a heavy burden to prove that a suspect waived his rights, 112 the
Court held that the state merely had to prevail based on a preponderance of
the evidence standard.113 During the 1970s, the Court began characterizing
Miranda protections as merely prophylactic, broader than the underlying
constitutional right.114 That line of argument continued into the 1980s in cases
like New York v. Quarles (creating the public safety exception to the
a
requirement of giving the warnings)' 1and Oregon v. Elstad (holding that
6
Because
Miranda's
mere Miranda violation had no evidentiary fruit)."
protections are merely prophylactic, the Court explained that it could balance
competing interests against the interests protected by the warnings."1 7
While many legal academics praised Miranda,"8 important critics
emerged."' Dean Caplan argued that the Court was wrong in adopting '"the
sporting theory' of justice": fairness in the Miranda context "dictates that
neither side should have an undue advantage; the police and the criminal
should be on roughly equal footing and the rules of the game should be drawn
to avoid favoring one side or the other." 2 0
According to Caplan, the Court was not only concerned with leveling
the playing field between the state and the suspect, but it was also concerned
with the disparate treatment between indigent, untrained suspects, and
wealthier or more sophisticated suspects. 2 ' For example, a wealthy suspect
would appear before the police with an attorney at his side, capable of dealing
with police questioning.1 22 Caplan posited that making confessions harder to
get from weak suspects was not the right solution; perhaps, the answer was

109. Pierre Thomas, Justice Seeks to Overturn Recent MirandaRuling, CNN (Mar. 10, 1999, 11:06
AM), http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/03/10/miranda/.
110. Yale Kamisar, The MirandaCase Fifty Years Later, B.U. L. REv. 1293, 1295 (2017).
111. But see Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
112. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
113. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477,489 (1972).
114. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984).
115. Id. at 649.
116. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
117. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657-58.
118. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's PracticalEffect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly
Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 500, 502 (1996).
119. See, e.g., Caplan, supra note 12; Paul Cassell, The Statute that Time Forgot: 18 U.S.C. § 3501
and the OverhaulingofMiranda, 85 IOWA L. REv. 175 (1999).
120. Caplan, supra note 12, at 1441-42.
121. Id. at 1455-58.
122. See id at 1456-58.
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making it easier to convict hardened criminals.1 2 3 Most importantly, "guilt is
personal.... To hold otherwise is to confuse justice with equality." 2 4
At various times, the Court had seemingly teed up Miranda to be
overruled.1 2 5Notably in Brewer v. Williams, a case involving a brutal murder
of a young girl, the Court seemed on the verge of abandoning Miranda.12 6 In
a 5-4 decision written by Justice Stewart, a Miranda dissenter, 127 the Court
held that the state violated Williams' Sixth Amendment right to counsel.1 2 8
Professor Paul Cassell led efforts to force the government to enforce 18
U.S.C. § 3501.129 Cassell, a strong victims' rights advocate, has argued that
Miranda has impaired the states' ability to convict guilty defendants."' He
believed that the government should test the constitutionality of§ 3501.131
By 2000, when the government finally attempted to rely on § 3501 in
the Supreme Court, the Court upheld Miranda as based on the
Constitution. 32 Chief Justice Rehnquist, appointed in effect to overrule the
decision' 33 and a settled Miranda foe, wrote the majority opinion in
Dickerson v. United States.' 3 4 The decision was noteworthy for a number of
reasons beyond Rehnquist's authorship. 13 He wrote for seven Justices; he
also wrote a remarkably tepid "endorsement" of Miranda's constitutional
foundation.' 3 6 Nonetheless, Miranda survived.'
Or did it? By 2000 (and since), the Court has repeatedly narrowed the
decision. 38 Indeed, many law enforcement officials now support the case. 3 9
Law enforcement officials know what they have to do to comply with the
law, and although voluntariness issues may still arise, they have to do

123.

Id. at 1467.

124.

RICHARD A. LEO & GEORGE C. THOMAS 1, THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND

&

POLICING 126 (1998).
125. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,394-95 (1977).
126. Id. at 397-98.
127. Mirandav. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,504-45 (1966) (Harlan& Stewart, JJ., dissenting) (White&
Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
128. See Brewer, 430 U.S. at 401-03.
129. Cassell, supra note 119, at 178.
130. Id. at 255.
131. Id.
132. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
133. See Kamisar, supra note 110, at 1294-95.
134. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 431.
135. See Yale Kamisar, Miranda's Reprieve, 92 A.B.A. J. 48, 51 (2006) (discussing how Justice
Rehnquist weakened Miranda).
136. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 431; see Erwin Chemerinsky, The Court ShouldHave RemainedSilent:
Why the Court Erredin DecidingDickerson v. United States, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 287,288-89 (2000).
137. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444.
138. Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court's Love-Hate Relationship with Miranda, 101 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY375,376(2011);see, e.g., Berghuisv. Thompkins, 560U.S. 370,387-91(2010); Maryland
v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010); Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 64 (2010).
139. Brief for Amicus Curiae the American Civil Liberties Union in Support of Petitioner, Dickerson
v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525), 2000WL 122085.
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relatively little beyond mere formal compliance with Miranda.14 0 Not long
after Dickerson, for example, Chief Justice Rehnquist joined an opinion
characterizing Miranda as merely a prophylactic rule. 14 1
The Court's case law has continued to chip away at the core protections.
One extreme example of the clear gutting of Miranda'score is the Court's
treatment of waiver in Berghuis v. Thompkins.1 42 There, the Court held that
an offender had to make an express request for silence.1 43 Beyond that, the
Court upheld a waiver of the suspect's Miranda rights based largely on a
record devoid of any facts, other than the confession itself, supporting the
waiver.144 That is a far cry from Miranda'sinsistence that a waiver would not
be lightly inferred from a silent record, and that the state carried a heavy
burden to establish the waiver.1 4 5
Many liberal legal academics have abandoned support for Miranda.14 6 1
may have summarized much of that sentiment in the title of a presentation
that I did at Bicocca Law School in Milan: Miranda v. Arizona: Sounds and
Fury Signifying Nothing?l4 71 nalmost every instance, Miranda's promise
seems to have failed; large numbers of suspects confess-1 48 many of those
are likely suspects who are most in need of counsel's help, perhaps out of
fear or out of lack of intellectual acumen.1 49 As one commentator has
observed, Miranda "protect[s] noncooperation and cover-up by the most
knowledgeable, cunning, and steely criminals, while providing only minimal
safeguards for those who are uneducated, unintelligent, or easily coerced." 5 0
Followers of Making a Murdererare all too familiar with Brendan Dassey, a

140. Bruce Peabody, Fifty Years Later, the Miranda Decision Hasn't Accomplished What the
Supreme CourtIntended, WASH.PosT (June 13, 2016,4:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/new
s/monkey-cage/wp/2016/06/13/your-miranda-rights-are-50-years-old-today-heres-how-that-decisionhas-aged/?utm_term=.ad2511b6b819.
141. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 643 (2004).
142. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 382.
143. Id. at 388-89.
144.

Id. at 388.

145. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) ("If the interrogation continues without the
presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate
that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right
to retained or appointed counsel.").
146. See Carol S. Steiker, Two Cheersfor Miranda, 97 B.U. L. REv. 1197, 1197 (2017) ("Many
commentators, including some of the contributors to this Symposium, have few kind words for Miranda,
either as a decision or as a body of doctrine operationalized in the world.").
147. Michael Vitiello, Presentation at Bicocca School of Law in Milan: Miranda v. Arizona: Sounds
and Fury Signifying Nothing? (Spring 2017).
148.
149.

DRESSLER&THOMAs,supra note 55, at 714.
Richard A. Leo, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, andImplications, 37 J. AM. ACAD.

PSYCHIATRY & L. 332, 335 (2009), http://jaapl.org/content/jaapl/37/3/332.full.pdf.
150. Howe, supra note 18, at 906.
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developmentally slow defendant, whose confession helped convict him and
his uncle Steven Avery.' Mirandawarnings did little to protect him.1 5 2
As Professor Al Alschuler has written, Mirandahas been criticized as
"a doctrinal failure, an ethical failure, a jurisprudential failure, and an
empirical failure." His argument is persuasive. Here are a few of his
criticisms: the Court misconstrued the Fifth Amendment; its rules have
produced "a mountain of nonsense law;" and it "promised legal assistance at
the stationhouse while ensuring that suspects would not get it." 5 4
Miranda contained a fatal flaw, as Justice White argued in his dissent.1 5 5
Any unwarned statement would be inadmissible no matter how
nonthreatening the questions were. 15 6 But if the majority's theory was that
the custodial setting was so inherently coercive that one could not trust such
easily procured confessions, why did the Miranda Court trust waivers of the
offender's rights made in that inherently coercive environment?' 5 7 As an
empirical matter, Justice White's point may explain why such large
158
percentages of offenders waive their Miranda rights.
As indicated, legal commentators across a broad spectrum find a great
deal to dislike about Miranda.15 9 Of course, arguments against Mirandacome
in many different shapes and sizes. But imagine a world without Miranda;
what might it look like?' 6 0 That is the subject of the next section.
IV. REIMAGINING MIRANDA
As suggested above, the Miranda Court hoped to resolve real
problems."' It eventually adopted Miranda as an alternative to its
voluntariness case law and its Sixth Amendment cases.1 6 2 The Court's
151.

Seth Abrarnovitch, 'Makinga Murderer': The Brendan Dassey Confession Viewers Didn'tSee,

HOLLYWOOD REP. (Jan. 16, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/making-a-

murderer-brendan-dassey-856343.
152. See Dassey v. Dittmann, 201 F. Supp. 3d 963 (E.D. Wis. 2016), rev'd en banc, 877
F.3d 297 (7th Cir. 2017). Dassey received Miranda warnings at various points. Dassey, 877 F.3d at 30610. Later, in part because the police videotaped Dassey's interviews, a federal district court found that his
confession was involuntary. Id. at 315. The court of appeals reversed. Id. at 318.
153. Alschuler, Miranda's FourfoldFailure,supra note 3, at 891.
154. Id. at 850.
155. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 532-33 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 534.
158. See Paul G. Cassell & Brett S. Hayman, Police Interrogationin the 1990s: An EmpiricalStudy
of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 842 (1996); see also Leo, supra note 19, at 282-83
(discussing defendants waiving their Mirandarights).
159. See Steiker, supra note 146.
160. See infra Part IV (exploring what the legal system would be like if Miranda were to be
abandoned).
161. See supraPart I (explaining how the Court intervened in cases with questionable confessions).
162. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 464-66; see Arnold H. Loewy, Distinguishing Confessions Obtained in
Violation of the Fifth Amendmentfrom Those Obtained in Violation of the Sixth Amendment, 50 TEX.
TECH L. REv. 145, 152 (2017).
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concerns were real then and remain real today: for so many reasons, the
police should not be able to extract statements from suspects, but assessing
voluntariness is exceedingly difficult at best.' 6 3 And equality matters:
unequal treatment of suspects has profound social consequences.' 64 But as
many on the left now recognize, Miranda failed to achieve those goals and
has created other bad consequences, including providing protection to the
wrong suspects. 165
Here, I want to return to Professor Loewy's work. He would have
preferred a Sixth Amendment right to counsel solution to custodial
interrogation.' 66 Currently, the state has no obligation to provide Sixth
Amendment counsel until formal proceedings begin. 6 7 In Escobedo v.
Illinois, the Court seemed to place the beginning of Sixth Amendment
criminal proceedings at the moment when an offender became a suspect, not
merely a witness-or as Escobedo discussed, at the moment when the state
began to focus on the offender as a suspect.' 6 8 Miranda rejected the Sixth
Amendment as the source for the right to counsel.1 69 As a result, today the
formal right to counsel begins only after some indication that the state is
commencing formal proceedings.1 70
The distinction between informal and formal proceedings can be quite
artificial.' 7 Thus, an offender who is arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant is
not yet entitled to Sixth Amendment counsel.1 7 2 Instead, the right attaches at
the time of arraignment on the warrant.1 73 Assume that the Court had
eventually equated Miranda and Sixth Amendment counsel: Would Sixth
Amendment protection of a suspect in the custodial setting have been more
robust than Mirandaprotection? The answer depends. The Court would have
had to struggle with other issues: notably, could offenders waive their Sixth

163. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Wadie E. Said, Coercing Voluntariness, 85 IND.
L.J. 1, 6 (2010).
164. See Bender, supra note 16; Tanner Colby, Affirmative Action: It's Timefor Liberals to Admit it
Isn't Working, SLATE (Feb. 10, 2014, 11:52 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/life/history/features/
2014/theliberalfailure onrace/affirmative action it s time for liberalstoadmit itisn-t-working.
html.
165. See Peabody, supra note 140.
166. Loewy, supra note 1, at 435; Loewy, supra note 162, at 147.
167. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (asserting that the right to counsel attaches
at preliminary hearings); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967) (holding that the right to
counsel attached to the post-indictment lineup); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932) (discussing
that the right to counsel begins at arraignment).
168. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964).
169. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,469-72 (1966).
170. See Danielle Lenth, Comment, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit ofJustice: A ComparativeLegal
Study ofthe Amanda Knox Case, 45 McGEORGE L. REV. 347, 361 (2014).
171. See Karen Akst Schecter, Comment, The Right to Counsel: Attachment Before CriminalJudicial
Proceedings, 47 FORDHAML.RE. 810, 812 (1979).
172. See id.
173. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S 387,398 (1977).

2019]

CONFESSIONS AND THE FIFTHAMENDMENT

77

Amendment right to counsel in the stationhouse?' 7 4 Even if the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attached at the custodial interrogation setting, if
the Court were to allow waiver, then the results would seem similar to the
Miranda world.17

1

As Justice White intimated in his Miranda dissent, if the primary
concern in Mirandawas the inherently coercive environment in the custodial
setting, then the best approach might have been to hold that no waiver could
take place absent consultation with counsel.1 76 Or framed differently, once an
offender's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached, the offender was then
functionally represented by counsel and could be approached only through
counsel.' 7 Perhaps suspects would not be able to waive their Sixth
Amendment counsel as easily as one can waive Miranda counsel. 7 8
The answer to the waiver question depends on a number of variables.
Cases like McNeil v. Wisconsin' and Patterson v. Illinois,so which
distinguished Mirandaand Sixth Amendment counsel, turned on the Court's
perception that counsel in the stationhouse and counsel in the courtroom
serve different functions."' Suspects in the stationhouse who invoke counsel
are signaling that they cannot negotiate the coercive environment without
counsel.' 8 2 Sixth Amendment counsel, by contrast, is the person who appears
in open court and performs more traditional lawyer functions.' 8 3 But were the
Court to recognize that custodial interrogation is part of a criminal
proceeding, and therefore within the ambit of the Sixth Amendment, one
might argue that counsel is not just a backbone against the coercive influence

174. My proposal would be ineffective if the police could get a waiver of Sixth Amendment counsel
in the stationhouse, largely for the reasons that Mirandahas been ineffective.
175. See also Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964) (holding that the defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights were violated when the government deliberately elicited incriminating statements from
him after he had been indicted and without counsel); cf Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 300 (1990)
(holding that Miranda warnings are not required when a suspect gives an incriminating statement to
undercover law enforcement).
176. See Edward Gregory Mascolo, Miranda v. Arizona Revisited and Expanded: No Custodial
Interrogation Without the PresenceofCounsel, 68 CONN. B.J. 305, 307 (1994).
177. See id. My argument parallels the theory adopted by some members of the Court; most notably,
Justice Stevens. See, e.g., Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 301-11 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 626-37 (1986). In Justice Stevens's majority opinion in Michigan v.
Jackson and his dissenting opinion in Patterson v. Illinois, he adopted the lawyer-as-medium theory, akin
to professional rules of responsibility. Patterson, 487 U.S. at 285; Jackson, 475 U.S. at 625; see MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (AM. BAR. ASS'N 2018).

178. See C. Allen Parker, Jr., ProposedRequirements for Waiver of the Sixth Amendment Right to
Counsel, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 364 (1982).
179. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
180. Patterson,487 U.S. 285.
181. See Justin Bishop Grewell, A Walk in the ConstitutionalOrchard DistinguishingFruits ofFfth
Amendment Right to Counselfrom Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel in Fellers v. United States, 95 J.
CluM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 725, 727 (2005).
182.
183.

Id. at 728-29.
Id.at730-31.
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of custody. 184 One might argue that counsel really is performing a lawyer's
role in that setting.'8 5
As an aside, some European countries follow such a rule.1 8 6 Many
American commentators, in their rush to criticize the Italian system when
Amanda Knox was found guilty there, ignored the fact that the Italian court
suppressed her inculpatory statement.' 8 7 Once she became a suspect, the
police could not continue to interrogate her without counsel. 8 8 That means,
in effect, there is no custodial interrogation of a suspect. 189
One should consider whether such a system could work in the United
States.' After all, the post-Miranda backlash was fueled by fears that
confessions would dry up. 9 ' And as Professor Loewy pointed out, at least
some justices agree with Justice Scalia's view that "the ready ability to obtain
uncoerced confessions is not an evil but an unmitigated good .... Admissions
of guilt resulting from valid Miranda waivers 'are more than merely
"desirable"; they are essential to society's compelling9 2 interest in finding,
convicting, and punishing those who violate the law."'l
Many of us would debate Justice Scalia's statement, at least in part.'9 3
Confessions secured from mentally impaired offenders may not be coerced
but should be of concern.'9 4 Securing confessions from offenders who
confess out of confusion about the nature of the charges against them causes
some of us to pause.1 95 Spano provides a good example in which a properly
warned offender might have been tricked into condemning himself to death,
even though he seemed to have available a partial defense to first-degree
murder.1 9 6
But as I suggested above, many believe our administration of justice
works best when the system has relevant evidence from all actors.1 97 Hence,
while we might object to extracting a confession from a weak, intimidated
suspect, we might also want to hear directly from, for example, Donald
184. See id
185. See id.
186. Lenth, supra note 170, at 357; see Salduz v. Turkey, 49 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008) (finding that access
to a lawyer should be provided from the first interrogation of a suspect by the police).
187. Lenth, supra note 170, at 380.
188. Id. at 357.
189. See id.
190. Id.
191. Cassell & Fowles, supra note 6, at 1060.
192. Loewy, supra note 1, at 428.
193. See id.
194. See Dassey v. Dittman, 201 F. Supp. 3d 963 (E.D. Wis. 2016), rev'd 877 F.3d 297 (7th Cir.
2017) (en banc).
195.

See PercentageofExonerations by ContributingFactor, NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS,

(last
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ExonerationsContribFactorsByCrime.aspx
updated Dec. 1, 2019). As of December 1, 2019, the National Registry of Exonerations cites false
confessions as the contributing factor of309 of2,522 total exonerations. Id.
196. See id.; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 319 (1959).
197. See supra Part I (implying the legal system works better if all relevant evidence is available).
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Trump, when the topic at hand is his involvement in the Russian
investigation.' 98
We have models in our system for what would happen even if the police
could not engage in custodial interrogation. 9 9 The state and federal
government routinely call witnesses, even suspects, before grand juries.2 0 0
The Court has rejected the idea that an offender has a right to counsel in the
grand jury room. 20 Of course, a suspect can invoke the Fifth Amendment
right to silence.20 2
Similarly, many of us consider our civil discovery rules to be an integral
part of the rule of law.20 3 Unique from countries around the world, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure allow parties to demand their opponents to reveal a
smoking gun, damning the opponent's own case.2 0 4
Why do some observers applaud liberal discovery in the civil procedure
context but hesitate to allow similar open discovery in the criminal
context? 205 Go back to Dean Caplan's observations: Many of us are worried
about the inequality of a system that allows the police to secure confessions
from offenders unable to afford counsel while their well-heeled counterparts
act pursuant to counsel's advice.2 0 6
One might question whether abandoning stationhouse interrogations
could have some unanticipated consequences. 2 0 7 In reviewing an earlier draft
of this paper, Dean Caplan raised a question: Whether my proposal would
impair the ability of the police to develop informants. 2 08 At times, a suspect
wants to curry favor with the police to uncover what the police know or
perhaps to make a deal to get back on the street. 2 0 9 Such negotiations often

198. See supra Part I (discussing the retrieval of all relevant evidence).
199. See Michael G. Heitz, Comment, The Rights ofa Witness Before the GrandJury, 43 Mo. L. REV.
714 (1978) (focusing on grand juries and witnesses' Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
200. Id. at 716.
201. Id. at 719.
202. Id. at 721.
203. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Discovery and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law Jurisdictions, 73
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1017, 1017 (1998) (explaining the role ofjudges in the American pretrial discovery
process).
204. See Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054, 1063 (Wash.
1933); see also In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d 867, 871 (7th Cir. 2015) (using the term,
smoking gun, to refer to highly important and material evidence); Pearson v. First NH Mortg. Corp., 200
F.3d 30, 34-35 (1st Cir. 1999) (discussing the smoking gun standard before anevidentiary hearing).
205. See Hazard, supra note 203, at 1017.
206. See Caplan, supranote 12, at 1456-58.
207. See E-mail from Gerald Caplan, Dean Emeritus, McGeorge School of Law to Mike Vitiello,
Distinguished Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law (Sept. 26, 2018, 14:50 PST) (on file with
author).
208. Id.
209.

See Michael L. Rich, Coerced Informants and Thirteenth Amendment Limitations on the

Police-InformantRelationship, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 681, 689-93 (2010).
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take place before arraignment or before other formal proceedings have
begun.

2 10

Even with its ugly underside, the police-informant relationship remains
an important law enforcement tool.2 1 1 The importance of informants to crime
detection and prevention is axiomatic. 2 1 2I suspect that increasing the role of
defense counsel would not end the police-informant relationship. Often, the
relationship between an officer and an informant develops on the street,
before the officer has busted the offender.2 1 3 That kind of contact would
remain subjudicial. 2 14 Even after arrest, a suspect might talk to an officer with
the hopes of gaining a favorable deal.2 15 An officer interested in developing
an informant might decide to cooperate and forego formal charges that would
require having involvement of counsel.2 16 Finally, even a represented
offender might have leverage: counsel might be able to negotiate with the
police in order to secure their client's release in exchange for information.2 17
Back to Mirandaand Chief Justice Warren. Insofar as equality animated
Miranda, a pro-MirandaCourt might see the benefits of curtailing custodial
interrogation by holding, similar to European systems, that suspects must
consult with counsel.2 18
For the system to work-i.e., protecting offenders' from unequal
treatment and police overreaching, but not impairing legitimate law
enforcement interests in solving crime-the Court would have to rethink one
of its holdings. 2 19 Again, compare our criminal justice and civil justice
systems: While a civil litigant can invoke an evidentiary privilege, such as
the Fifth Amendment, the law allows the opponent of a party who invokes
the Fifth Amendment to argue that the factfinder may draw unfavorable
inferences from that invocation.22 0
A year before Miranda, the Court held that the state could not instruct a
jury that it might draw an unfavorable inference from an offender's
invocation of the Fifth Amendment.2 2 Professor Alschuler argued that
210. See Laurie Magid, Questioning the Question-ProofInmate: Defining Miranda Custody for
IncarceratedSuspects, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 883, 897 (1997).
211. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Prosecuting the Informant Culture, 109MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1077
(2011).
212. See Michael L. Rich, Lessons ofDisloyalty in the World ofCriminalnformants,49 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1493, 1495 (2012).
213. See Rich, supra note 209, at 693.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 681-83.
216. See id. at 697-99.
217. See id. at 695.
218. See Charles D. weisselberg, Exporting and Importing Miranda, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1235, 1250
(2017).
219. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (holding that prosecutors cannot comment
on a defendant's Fifth Amendment right not to testify).
220. Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game-Theoretic
Analysis ofthe Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430, 484-87 (2000).
221. Griffin, 380 U.S. at614-15.
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Grffin v. California is not consistent with the language of the Fifth
Amendment and the original understanding of the Fifth Amendment. 222
Along with some other legal commentators, Alschuler predicted real benefits
were the Court to overrule Griffin.2 23 1agree.
What would a system look like with no custodial interrogation once an
offender becomes a suspect? The state could not approach the offender
without counsel. But either by calling the offender before a grand jury or by
interviewing the offender along with counsel in open court, the state would
be able to gain that offender's version of the facts.2 2 4 Of course, a guilty
offender could refuse to confess, but would have to balance invoking one's
Fifth Amendment right to refuse to cooperate with the inference that the
factfinder -might draw from the invocation of the Fifth Amendment.2 2 5
Currently, if a suspect invokes the Mirandaright to counsel, almost certainly
counsel tells the suspect to keep his mouth shut.2 2 6 That might not be sound
advice if the state will be able to use the right-to-silence invocation as
evidence of guilt. 22 7

Think back to Spano, the young, mentally unstable defendant tricked
into confessing to first-degree murder when the facts suggested a voluntary
manslaughter partial defense. 2 2 8He is hardly unique. A factor often leading
to the conviction of an innocent offender is the offender's false confession.2 2 9
As in Spano, or in the case of Brendan Dassey, the presence of counsel during
any interrogation would allow a fuller and more accurate presentation of the
facts. 2 30 Also, in such a system, courts would no longer have to make
assessments of voluntariness.231 Counsel could act as a bulwark against
coercive pressure and, if such questioning took place in the open, the inherent
coercion of the stationhouse would no longer be a factor.2 3 2

222.
223.

See id.; Alschuler, PeculiarPrivilege, supra note 3, at 2668.
Alschuler, Peculiar Privilege, supra note 3, at 2668; see also Jane Elinor Notz, Comment,

PrearrestSilence as Evidence ofGuilt:What You Don't Say Shouldn'tBe Used Against You, U. CHI. L.

RE. 1009, 1015 (1997) (arguing that Griffin is "limited to right to silence at trial").
224. See Heitz, supra note 199, at 721-22.
225. Cf Seidmann & Stein, supra note 220, at 440 (speaking to the ability of the opposing party to
argue an adverse inference be taken when a party invokes his or her Fifth Amendment right).
226. See Scott C. Stansbury, Berghuis v. Thompkins andMirandaRights:Speaking Up to Stay Silent,
38 S.U. L. REV. 317, 344 (2011).
227. See Notz, supra note 223, at 1010.
228. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959); see Seidmann & Stein, supra note 220, at 43637.
229. Leo, supra note 149, at 323-33.
230. See Dassey v. Dittmann, 201 F. Supp. 3d 963, 1005 (E.D. Wis. 2016), rev'd, 877
F.3d 297 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Spano, 360 U.S. at 315. In Spano, for example, counsel could have
developed facts supportive of Spano's possible partial defense that his crime amounted only to voluntary
manslaughter. Id
231.

DRESSLER& THOMAS, supra note 55, at 600-01.

232. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966) ("[I]nterrogation environment is created for
no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will ofhis examiner.").
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In such a system, Miranda's goal of equality would be achieved: rich
and poor defendants would be subject to questioning with counsel present in
open court.2 3 3Rich and poor alike would have to reveal relevant information,
unless the suspect made an informed decision to invoke the Fifth
Amendment.23 4
V. CONCLUSION

As we celebrate Professor Loewy's work, we also mark the fifty years
since the end of the Warren Court's criminal procedure revolution. Sadly
many of us, including Professor Loewy, no longer have much faith in
Miranda, one of the Court's signature and revolutionary opinions. 235 But I
believe that I share a good bit of common ground with Professor Loewy:
Miranda was trying to solve a real problem.2 3 6 I believe that Professor
Loewy's argument for a Sixth Amendment right to counsel in place of
Miranda, especially supplemented by my argument for questioning in open
goal without significant losses to the
court, would achieve Miranda's
23
7
a s omu
justice.
administration of crimmnal

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

See Caplan, supranote 12, at 1457-58.
See Heitz, supranote 199, at 721.
See GRAHAM, supra note 4, at 158-59.
Loewy, supra note 1, at 435.
Id.

